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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress amended the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”)
in 1970 to create a fiduciary duty among investment advisers with
respect to compensation for services provided, and a private right of
1
action for security holders to enforce that duty. Thirty-four years
later, security holders of several mutual funds brought an action
against the funds’ investment adviser, alleging that the adviser’s
2
compensation was excessive in violation Section 36(b) of the ICA.
The Seventh Circuit departed from standard used in other circuits,
and emphasized only the candor of the adviser to the board when
determining whether or not the adviser’s compensation was lawful
3
under the ICA. The court based its decision on the competition of
the mutual fund market and the sophistication of individual investors
4
to keep an adviser’s compensation at an efficient level, while the
precedent stated that investment advisers do not in reality compete
5
with each other for advisory contracts with mutual funds. In light of
6
the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
J.D. candidate, 2011, Duke University School of Law.
1. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 927 *2d Cir. 1982); 15
U.S.C.A. § 80a–35(b) (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
2. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Jones I), aff’d, 527 F.3d
627 (7th Cir. 2008) reh’g en banc denied, 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
1579 (2009).
3. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II).
4. Id.
5. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929.
6. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones III) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (indicating the decision created a circuit split).
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which standard should be used to determine whether a mutual fund’s
fees are excessive under § 36(b).
II. FACTS
Harris Associates (“Harris”) is an investment advisement
company responsible for managing a group of mutual funds
7
collectively known as the Oakmark complex of funds. Harris’s
compensation for managing the funds investment adviser was
8
determined annually by Oakmark’s board of trustees. In setting
Harris’ compensation, the board examined “the fund’s performance,
the services Harris provided,” the fees Harris charged other clients,
9
the fees other investment advisers charged to manage similar funds.
The board calculated the fees for all three funds as one percent or less
of the funds’ total assets at the end of the preceding month, and
included breakpoints, or a fee reduction when assets grew above a
10
certain amount. For example, the eponymous fund of the complex
agreed to pay Harris “1% of the first $2 billion of the [f]und’s assets,
0.9% for the next $1 billion, 0.8% for the next $2 billion, and then
11
0.75% for assets in excess of $5 billion.” The other two funds at issue
12
had similar fee schedules. These fees were “roughly the same (in
both level and breakpoints) as those that other funds of similar size
13
and investment goals pay their advisers.” Harris also provided
information for the fees that they charged “institutional clients”—
clients not affiliated with a mutual fund—which included fee
14
percentages and breakpoints with significantly lower amounts,
15
sometimes even half of the fees they charged mutual funds.
The board of Oakmark which approved the compensation scheme
was comprised of ten members, several of whom maintained business
16
relationships with Harris. Victor Morgenstern previously worked for

7. Jones II, 527 F.3d at 629; Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1.
8. Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. at *2. (delineating exact percentages and breakpoints for the other two funds,
Global and Equity. ).
13. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II).
14. Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1 (“For institutional clients with investment strategies
similar to Oakmark’s the percentages ranged from 0.075% to 0.35%, with breakpoints ranging
from $15 million to $500 million.”).
15. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting)(Jones
III).
16. Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *1.
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Harris and retired in 2001; John Raitt left the board to become CEO
and President of Harris in 2003; and Peter Voss was CEO and
17
President of Harris’s parent company. Morgenstern maintained
social and business relationships with employees at Harris, and the
other board members also had personal, social, and non-fund business
18
relationships with Harris employees. These relationships raised an
issue of whether the board had set Harris’ compensation in an truly
19
arm’s-length transaction.
The plaintiff shareholders brought derivative suits on behalf of the
mutual funds in August of 2004, claiming that Harris had violated §
20
36(b) of the ICA. The shareholders claimed that Harris breached its
fiduciary duty under § 36(b) by (1) charging the Oakmark funds at a
substantially higher rate than institutional clients; (2) failing to
recognize cost-savings from economies of scale in determining the fee
schedule; and (3) violating the ICA requirement of arm’s-length
21
dealings with the Oakmark board.
The District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois applied the Gartenberg test and
concluded that the fees were not excessive because they reflected the
22
rates of other mutual funds. In granting the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the district court also concluded that most of the
violations asserted by the plaintiffs were not within the scope of the
private right of action created for shareholders under § 36(b) because
the defendant’s actions did not constitute an actual conflict of interest
23
resulting in harm to the shareholders. The plaintiffs appealed from
24
this grant of summary judgment.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress long ago concluded that
investment companies required special
“potential for abuse inherent in the
25
companies.” This belief led Congress

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Amicus
2009).

mutual funds and other
regulation based on the
structure of investment
to pass the Investment

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9–*13.
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II).
Jones I, 2007 WL 627640, at *5.
Jones II, 527 F.3d at 629.
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979), quoted in Brief of the United States as
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 15,
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Company Act of 1940, which contained multiple provisions designed
to guard against potential conflicts of interest common to investment
26
companies. Over time, however, significant growth in the mutual
27
fund market rendered the ICA ineffective. Congress amended the
ICA in 1970 to include Securities and Exchange Commission
proposals, which cited studies that illuminated the existing Act’s
28
deficiencies. One of the ICA amendments was § 36(b), which creates
a private right of action to enforce a new fiduciary duty of mutual
fund advisers when negotiating their fees:
the investment adviser of a registered investment company
shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the
receipt of compensation for services paid by such registered
investment company . . . [and a]n action may be brought under
this subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder
against such adviser . . . It shall not be necessary to allege or
prove that any defendant engaged in personal misconduct and
the plaintiff shall
have the burden of proving a breach of
29
fiduciary duty.
Several circuits have looked to the legislative history and textual
clues of the ICA in an effort to determine the meaning of fiduciary
30
duty. Although no consistent definition has emerged, in Green v.
Fund Asset Management, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
examined the structure of the fiduciary duty created by § 36(b) and
concluded that it was more narrow than the common law doctrine of
31
fiduciary duty for two reasons. First, the ICA limits damages claimed
from the breach of fiduciary duty to the actual damages paid to the
recipient and limits recovery to one year prior to the initiation of the
32
suit. Second, the plaintiff has the burden to prove breach, a
significant departure from the common law requirement placing the
33
burden on the fiduciary to justify its conduct. These conditions
ensured that the federal cause of action created by § 36(b) would be

26. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536 (1984).
27. Id. at 537.
28. Id. at 537–538.
29. 15 U.S.C.A.§ 80a–35(b) (West 2003).
30. See Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that §
36(b) of the ICA was not meant to revolutionize the industry practice, but provide a narrow
federal remedy); Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir.
1982) (examining failed legislative bills, the Senate Report, and the House Committee Report).
31. Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 286 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 2002).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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34

more narrow.
In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, the Second
Circuit outlined what would become the generally-accepted standard
for determining whether an investment adviser had violated its
35
This standard became known as the
fiduciary duty under § 36(b).
Gartenberg test, which considers:
[W]hether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range
of what would have been negotiated at arm’s-length in light of
all the surrounding circumstances. . . . To be guilty of a
violation of § 36(b), therefore, the adviser-manager must
charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no
reasonable relationship to the services rendered and
could not
36
have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.
Gartenberg set out a number of non-exclusive factors to be
considered when examining whether the fees were excessive: the
similarity of fees to those charged at other mutual funds; the
comparability of fees charged to institutional clients with similar
services; the cost to the adviser to provide services to the fund; the
nature and quality of the services, including the historical
performance of the fund; the economies of scale the adviser gains as
the fund’s assets increase; the volume of orders from the investors
that need to be processed; and the conduct, expertise, and level of
37
information that trustees of the fund possessed. After examining
these and other factors, the court must determine if the fees fall
“within the range” of fees possibly arrived at after arm’s-length
38
negotiations.
IV. HOLDING
To determine whether Harris breached its fiduciary duty to the
plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit analyzed each of the claims filed under
39
the ICA. The court first determined that several ICA sections
implicated by the plaintiff’s claims were not applicable because the
court found that “although § 36(b) creates a private right of action,

34. See id. (discussing the limited damages, shifted burden of proof, as well as the Senate
report that accompanied the act).
35. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
36. Id.
37. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Jones I).
38. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
39. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II).
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the other sections we have mentioned do not.” The plaintiffs, on the
other hand, wished to include these violations as evidence of the
failure of the board to negotiate at arm’s-length and establish efficient
41
fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the fund violated the ICA by failing
to ensure at least forty percent of the board members were
42
disinterested in their relationships with the adviser. The plaintiffs
claimed that due to the fund’s failure to reveal the financial links
43
between its trustees and adviser, the adviser’s compensation was not
44
controlled by a majority of disinterested trustees. The Seventh
Circuit made “short work” of these claims, concluding that none of
the alleged violations had a private right of action attached to them
45
and further that there had been no actual violation of the sections.
The court analyzed the status of Trustee Morgenstern and decided
that although Morgenstern was an “interested” party, seven of the
nine trustees were deemed “disinterested” parties—enough for a
46
majority and above the required forty percent. The court declared
that although the “[p]laintiffs ask us to suppose that Morgenstern
possessed some Svengali-like sway over the other trustees, so that his
presence in the room was enough to spoil their decisions,” interested
trustees retained the right to speak and discuss votes on the contract,
and the board would have approved the compensation even without
47
counting his vote.
Next, the court turned to “the main event”—the plaintiffs § 36(b)
48
claim that the adviser’s fees were excessive. The Seventh Circuit,
49
however, specifically disavowed the Gartenberg test. The court
declared that the only applicable standard was that “[a] fiduciary must
make full disclosure and play no tricks [on the board of trustees] but
50
is not subject to a cap on compensation.” The court declared that the
51
markets would establish the adviser’s compensation. By presuming
that the mutual fund markets are efficient, the court held that the

40. Id.
41. Brief of Petitioners at 12–13, Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. June 10, 2009).
42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–10(a) (West 2003).
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–33(b).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–15(c) .
45. Jones II, 527 F.3d at 629.
46. Id. at 629–30.
47. Id. at 630.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 632.
50. Id.
51. See id. (“The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote with their feet and dollars),
rather than a judge or jury, determine how much advisory services are worth.”)
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only cause of action under § 36(b) is for a failure to make full
52
disclosure. The Seventh Circuit held that the term “fiduciary duty”
invoked the law of trusts, which required “candor in negotiation, and
honesty in performance” but allowed fiduciaries the ability to
53
negotiate their compensation without judicial scrutiny.
Given the large number of mutual funds, the court decided that
54
competition sufficiently protected investors from excessive fees. The
evidence that Harris charged lower fees to institutional clients was
dismissed based on the court’s observation that “[d]ifferent clients call
55
for different commitments of time.” Finally, because the plaintiffs
never alleged that Harris deceived the funds’s board of trustees, the
Seventh Circuit held that the compensation should stand and
56
affirmed the district court’s decision.
The case came up on appeal for a rehearing en banc, and when
57
rehearing was denied Judge Posner dissented. The dissent argued
that the court erred in rejecting Gartenberg, and the majority
analogized the circumstances of mutual fund compensation too
closely to other industries that do not face the same conflicts of
58
interest.
V. ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit’s departure from the Gartenberg standard is
troubling. The Gartenberg standard has been an accepted part of
American law for more than twenty years, and has been relied on by
mutual fund companies, other circuits and Securities and Exchange
Commission regulators. Jones v. Harris was the first decision to
disapprove the Gartenberg standard; meanwhile, other circuits have
59
made a “slew of positive citations” supporting Gartenberg. The SEC
also approved the factors detailed in Gartenberg by incorporating the
60
factors into SEC regulations, creating a history of reliance on this
analysis in the mutual fund industry.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
III).
58.
59.
60.
23–24.

Id.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 cmt. f).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 634–35.
Id. at 635.
Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting) (Jones
Id. at 730–733.
Id. at 729.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 25, at
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision is that it rests on what Judge
61
Posner called “an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination.”
Jones v. Harris stated that “just as plaintiffs are skeptical of
Gartenberg because it relies too heavily on markets, we are skeptical
62
about Gartenberg because it relies too little on markets.” The
opinion further noted that the model of board approval that mutual
funds use to determine adviser compensation is similar to that of
large corporations, and that this model is not subject to judicial
63
oversight in that context. The court’s decision ultimately put its faith
in the presumed sophistication of individual investors to keep
investment adviser fees competitive by shopping around for mutual
64
funds with lower fees. However, this analysis all relies on the court’s
presumption that the mutual fund market is efficient. This reasoning
ignores a body of literature indicating that mutual funds boards’
conflicts of interest defeat the boards’ incentives to bargain for lower
65
compensation. By establishing a principle similar to the business
judgment rule, the court ignored the fact that “although mutual funds
have the trappings of typical corporations, their external management
66
structure sets them apart.” Mutual fund boards are often composed
67
of interested parties, semi-interested parties, or advisers of other
mutual funds, resulting in a truly “captive” board more interested in
68
creating profits for the adviser than the fund.
The new standard suggested by the Seventh Circuit seemingly
contradicts the purpose of the statute. Section 36(b) of the ICA
specifically provides that the board’s approval “shall be given such
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the
69
circumstances.” This seems to contemplate a thorough test, such as
Gartenberg, rather than the deferential standard outlined in Jones v.
61. Jones III, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).
62. Jones v. Harris Assocs., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008) (Jones II).
63. Id. at 632–33.
64. Id. at 634–35.
65. Jones III, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).
66. Emily Johnson, Note, The Fiduciary Duty in Mutual Fund Excessive Fee Cases: Ripe for
Reexamination, 59 DUKE L.J. 145, 151 (2009) (discussing the fact that the close nexus between
investment advisers and the mutual fund board undermines the any incentive of the board to
establish meaningful limits on the adviser).
67. A review of the relationships in this case set out in the district court opinion, Jones v.
Harris Assocs., 2007 WL 627640 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (Jones I), shows that even the
“uninterested” board members had close ties to Harris Assocs. through other members of the
board or other business arrangements, so close as to make them probably all excessively
sympathetic to the advisers they are bargaining with at “arm’s length.”
68. Jones III, 537 F.3d at 730–32 (comparing investment fund advisor compensation to
executive compensation).
69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b)(2) (West 2003) (emphasis added).
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Harris. However, under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, the § 36(b)
fiduciary duty would be so narrow that meeting it would require no
more than compliance with other sections of the ICA, effectively
70
rendering the section redundant. This standard seems unlikely to be
affirmed on appeal.
VI. ARGUMENTS
Petitioners’ Arguments
The shareholders presented two arguments urging the Court to
overturn the Seventh Circuit’s decision. The first argument was that
the “fiduciary duty” imposed on mutual fund investment advisers by §
36(b) is a two-prong requirement: an obligation to disclose “all
material facts relating to” compensation and an obligation that the
compensation they receive be fair and negotiated for “in an arm’s71
length transaction.” In the second argument the shareholders attack
the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on a competitive market to keep fees
efficient. Specifically, they claim mutual funds do not operate in a
competitive environment and the ICA was designed with this in
72
mind.
First, the shareholders argued that the fiduciary duty provided for
in § 36(b) requires investment advisers to do two things: disclose
information about their compensation and negotiate for their
compensation in an arm’s length transaction. This standard is an
expansion of Gartenberg as currently applied because it incorporates
more evidence into the analysis of objective fairness and also
incorporates other procedural requirements of the ICA into the
private action. In support of their argument, the shareholders point
to the text of § 36(b) of the ICA. They point out that § 36(b) uses the
term “fiduciary duty,” a term which had a “set” common law meaning.
According to the comments to the Restatement of Trusts, common
law fiduciary duty required both full and accurate disclosure to the
beneficiary of all material facts of the transaction as well as a
73
transaction that is fair to the beneficiary. The shareholders argued
that the Court should presume that the fiduciary duty in § 36(b) is the
70. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 25, at
14 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-15(c) and 80b-6).
71. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 41, at 17.
72. Id. at 34.
73. Id. at 21–22 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. g.).
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same as the common law fiduciary duty because, according to the
canons of statutory construction, when Congress incorporates an
established common law term into a statute, Congress is presumed to
74
The
incorporate the common law meaning of that term.
shareholders claim that Congress’ intent to incorporate the traditional
common law trust definition of “fiduciary duty” into § 36(b) of the
ICA is further supported by the Court’s decision in Pepper v. Litton,
where the they stated that even where a fiduciary has made full
75
disclosure, the court should still closely review it for fairness.
Although they disagree with some of the “gloss” that later cases have
76
applied to this standard, the petitioners argue that the core of the
Gartenberg standard correctly incorporates this common law
foundation where it states: “an adviser breaches its fiduciary duty
under § 36(b) when it charges a fee that exceeds what could be
77
obtained in an arm’s-length transaction”
Second, the petitioners claim that the standard applied by the
78
Seventh Circuit conflicts with the purpose of the ICA. The
petitioners argue that while the court below looked to the wrong
situation when incorporating the common law rules surrounding a
fiduciary duty: it erred by comparing the facts of this case—a captive
mutual fund—to a situation where a trust is created, rather than an
79
ongoing trust relationship. Petitioners claim that while a trust is
created, the parties engage in arms-length bargaining, but an ongoing
80
trust relationship triggers additional duties for the fiduciary. They
assert that the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that board approval was
“conclusive” conflicts with the plain language of the ICA stating that
“director approval should be afforded only ‘such consideration by the
81
court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.’” In
their effort to discredit the Seventh Circuit’s new standard,
Petitioners then attack the Seventh Circuit’s analogies to other
82
sources of law applied in the opinion. The shareholders claimed that
the circumstances that mutual funds operate are entirely different
74. Id. at 20 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999)).
75. Id. at 25–28 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)).
76. Id. at 33 n. 25.
77. Id. at 33.
78. Id. at 34.
79. Id. at 34–37.
80. Id. at 37.
81. Id. at 38 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-15(a)(2)).
82. Id. at 40 (stating that the fiduciary duty of a mutual fund adviser is unlike that of a
lawyer or corporation because in the case of the former conflicts of interest occur much more
often).
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than the other businesses the Seventh Circuit compares, because they
83
lack a true competitive market. The petitioners point to the avowed
purposes of the ICA found in the Act’s legislative history and argue
that, contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s decision to rely on the market,
Congress amended the Act because it did not trust markets to
manage mutual fund fees in light of the potential for conflicts of
84
interest.
Respondent’s Arguments
Harris makes three arguments in its defense of the district court’s
decisions.
Notably, the respondent supports a return to the
Gartenberg standard, and does not support the standard set forth in
85
the Seventh Circuit’s decision. Instead, Harris’s arguments all
attempt to support its position under the Gartenberg standard, which
86
the district court used to decide the case.
First, Harris attacks the petitioners’ proposed standard using
87
textual arguments. It focuses on the fact that the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to prove that they the fee could not have been
88
reached at an arm’s-length. Respondent rejects the second prong of
the petitioners’ proposed fiduciary standard, and claims that Congress
intentionally wrote the ICA in a way that avoided a “reasonableness”
89
90
test. It relies on the structure of § 36(b) and the Senate’s change in
the ICA bill from wording that included “reasonableness” to
91
“fiduciary duty.” Respondent then attacks the first prong of the
petitioners’ standard by claiming that there is no right of action for
92
violations of board procedure in deciding fees and notes that
“[s]ection 36(b) is sharply focused on the question of whether the fees
93
themselves were excessive.” It argues that under the correct
Gartenberg standard “the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so

83. Id.
84. Id. at 41–48.
85. See Brief for Respondent at 26, Jones v. Harris Assocs., No. 08-586 (U.S. Aug. 27,
2009) (lacking any argument supporting the Seventh Circuit’s decision to disapprove of
Gartenberg).
86. Id. at 25–49.
87. Id. at 26–32.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 32–33.
90. See id. (creating a duty for the plaintiffs to prove a breach of fiduciary duty, rather than
the normal duty for the defendants to prove no breach).
91. Id. at 36 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at 142–44 (1966)).
92. Id. at 44–46. Both the district and appellate courts applied the same analysis.
93. Id. at 44 (citing Migdal v. Rowe Prince Fleming Int’l, 248 F.3d 321, 328 (4th Cir. 2001)).

56

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POL’Y SIDEBAR [VOL. 5:45

disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to
the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s94
length bargaining,” to constitute a violation.
The respondent’s second argument focuses on the potential policy
ramifications inherent in the petitioners’ two-prong test: higher fees
passed on to investors. The respondent claims that the petitioners’
two-prong standard would “doom” any mutual fund adviser to a
95
trial. It argues that the “fairness” (first) prong of the petitioners’
proposed standard would be nearly impossible to prove on summary
judgment because of the possible expert testimony that stated the fees
96
“should have been resolved differently.” Similarly, Respondent
asserts that the “fair process” (second) prong would always lead to a
trial because there would be an issue of fact as to whether some board
97
member or another was “interested.” The massive costs of litigation
would force advisers to prepare for potentially far greater liability,
which would force advisers to charge significantly higher fees to
98
investors. The respondent contends that “[t]he real advantages to
99
petitioner’s standard are the benefits that accrue to lawyers.”
The respondent puts forth a final argument in the event that the
Seventh Circuit opinion is overturned. The respondent draws the
Court’s attention to the district court opinion where the Gartenberg
standard was applied in the “disproportionately large” manner that
the respondent supports, and emphasize the fact that the district court
100
found “the Gartenberg ‘factors’ all weigh against Petitioners.” The
respondent argues that even if the Supreme Court overturns the
standard that the Seventh Circuit established when they disapproved
Gartenberg, the motion for summary judgment should be upheld since
the district court’s legal and factual analysis was undisturbed by the
101
appellate court.
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION
This case seems destined for a reversal that addresses the
applicable standard but affirms the judgment. The vehement dissent
94.
1982)).
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 26, (citing Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2nd Cir.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54–55.
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by Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc
makes strong arguments, supported by voluminous academic
research, that the appellate opinion’s economic reasoning was
102
flawed. The amicus curiae brief of the Solicitor General also adds
weight to the petitioners’ arguments for a more encompassing review
of all the circumstances in a § 36(b) claim rather than the limited
standard the Seventh Circuit established and a return to a definition
consistent with SEC regulations that relied on the previous
103
Even the respondent seems prepared for the
circumstances.
standard to be overturned, as its final argument in its brief reminds
the Court that they were awarded summary judgment by the district
104
court using the Gartenberg standard. It is likely that the Supreme
Court will vacate the new standard created by the Seventh Circuit
and reaffirm the Gartenberg standard, thus resolving the circuit split
and restoring consistency across this federal common law issue. While
the petitioners’ proposed standard expands the narrow action
established under the ICA too far, by accepting the Seventh Circuit’s
standard the action is effectively read out of existence. The Court may,
however, be reluctant to overturn the findings of the trier of fact and
choose to affirm the initial entry of summary judgment.

102. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(Jones III).
103. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 25,
at 14.
104. Brief for Respondent, supra note 85, at 54–55.

